Anonymity with identity escrow attempts to allow users of an online service to remain anonymous, while providing the possibility that the service owner can break the anonymity in exceptional circumstances, such as to assist in a criminal investigation. In the article, we propose an identity escrow protocol that distributes user identity among several escrow agents. The main feature of our scheme is it is based on standard encryption algorithms and it provides user anonymity even if all but one escrow holders are dishonest acting in a coalition. We also present analysis of the anonymity property of our protocol in the applied pi-calculus. We review a related scheme by Marshall and Molina-Jiminez [2003] that aimed to achieve goals similar to ours, and show that their scheme suffers from serious weaknesses. 
INTRODUCTION
With the increasing sophistication and adoption of communication systems in businesses and personal use, privacy and anonymity has become a concern among users [BusinessWeek 2000; Cranor et al. 1999; Harris 1999] . Service usages (such as usage of mobile phones, Internet, financial payments) are routinely logged, and these logs will allow organizations to build sophisticated profiles of customers and their preferences and associates. Users fear that this information could be abused. But while users may wish for complete privacy and anonymity, the failure of digital cash to achieve widespread adoption shows that society as a whole also requires security and accountability. Digital cash failed because it would allow criminal behavior to go undetected. An appropriate balance between unrestricted anonymity and totalitarian security needs to be found, and this is likely to be a major theme in security research for some years.
Identity escrow attempts to provide such a balance for some applications. It allows users to access services anonymously while guaranteeing that service providers can break the anonymity in special circumstances, for example, to assist in a criminal investigation. If Alice wishes to use the service from provider S, she first puts her identity in escrow with an escrow agent T, from whom she obtains a token. She presents the token to S as evidence that she has placed her identity in escrow. S allows her to use the service anonymously. In the event of service misuse, S can apply to T to obtain the identity of the user corresponding to the token.
The term "identity escrow" was first introduced by Kilian and Petrank [1998] , which was motivated by the ideas from key escrow encryption systems (e.g., Leighton [1994] and Micali [1993] ). The idea can also be traced in group signature schemes and anonymous credential systems, which are mechanisms which can be used to offer identity escrow Lysyanskaya 2001, 2004; Camenisch and Shoup 2003; Kiayias and Yung 2004] . Clearly, the systems break down if a single escrow agent (known as group manager or issuer) holds the escrowed identity and he is dishonest; he can reveal Alice's identity even if the agreed conditions for doing so have not been met. To address this problem the escrow agent can be implemented as a set of agents called token providers [Kilian and Petrank 1998 ]. Neither S nor any token provider are supposed to know the identity behind an escrowed certificate, but if it is proved necessary, all token providers can cooperate in order to reveal it.
We propose a new identity escrow scheme that offers several advantages over the escrow schemes mentioned before. In our scheme, the escrowed identity is distributed among several token providers chosen by the user and the user's list (except for the last token provider in the list) is not revealed when he presents his token to the service provider. Moreover, our scheme uses standard cryptographic primitives, which are better known than zero-knowledge proofs and more widely implemented in APIs. Having said that, there are some features of our protocol which may make it unattractive in some cases. Although the cryptographic primitives are standard, they are not computationally inexpensive. The distribution of trust in a large number of token providers is great for the user, but service providers may not like it because obtaining a user's identity in the event of misuse requires all the token providers to be available. We expect the protocol to find applications in niche areas where the anonymity requirement is paramount, and misuse is rare.
We model and analyze our protocol in the applied pi-calculus, and show that it satisfies the anonymity property. In an earlier work Marshall and MolinaJiminez [2003] proposed a protocol that aimed to achieve goals similar to ours: · 41: 3 distribute escrowed user identity among several trusted parties using standard cryptographic primitives. However, their scheme puts strong assumptions on escrow agents and suffers from serious weaknesses which we mention in the article.
The article is organized as follows. In the following two sections, we present our protocol together with its formal analysis in the applied pi-calculus. Next, we briefly detail Marshall and Molina-Jiminez's [2003] protocol and the problems we have identified with it, and conclude in Section 5. Appendix A summarizes the applied pi-calculus, for the benefit of readers not familiar with it. Appendix B contains the proofs of lemmas we rely upon for our analysis.
Our protocol together with its preliminary analysis appeared in Mukhamedov and Ryan [2007] and our analysis of Marshall and MolinaJiminez's [2003] protocol appeared in Mukhamedov and Ryan [2005] .
THE PROTOCOL
The protocol is based on the idea that certain agents that we call token providers assist the user by helping him construct an onion. The user's identity is in the innermost layer, while the service key with which the user obtains the service is in the outermost layer. In the event of an upheld complaint, one can link the service key and the user's identity by contacting all the token providers that were used. If they are honest, they will only assist in the link if there really is an upheld complaint. Thus, the anonymity of the user is guaranteed even if all but one escrow holders are dishonest.
2.0.1 Notation. The following labeling conventions are used throughout the article.
-S denotes an anonymous service provider. -T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . .} is a set of identity token providers.
-i is an identity token issued by T a i . We write A for the full identity token obtained by A by using the protocol. -K A is A's long-term public key. K [A] is the public part of A's ephemeral key that it uses to access anonymous services provided by S. K [A] is freshly generated by A for each service usage and no other agent knows the correspondence between K [A] and A. -{m} K is the message m deterministically encrypted with the public key K and
[m] K − is A's universally verifiable signature on m.
Our protocol consists of two parts. First, there is a sign-up protocol, which is the main protocol that is executed by A to receive a token from the members of T. The token permits A to use the service from S. Next, there is a complaint resolution protocol, which is executed by S upon a misuse of its service in order to reveal the identity of the offending anonymous user.
Sign-Up.
Alice has a long-term certified public key K A . She creates a temporary service public key K [A] which she will use to identify herself to S. Then she proceeds to build up an onion n (actions 1, 2 that follow). At the end Fig. 1 . Illustration of the sign-up protocol in the case n = 4. Messages from A are encrypted with the public key of the receiver (this encryption is not shown).
of this process, the onion consists of the service key K [A] in its center, wrapped with encryptions and signatures by the token providers. This is then paired with Alice's identity A, and by engaging in the protocol with token providers, it is wrapped again by encryptions and signatures of the token providers. The formal definition follows; an illustration in the case n = 4 is given in Figure 1 .
The onion build-up is detailed as follows. Alice choses a sequence of token providers T a 1 , T a 2 , . . . , T a n from T (possibly with duplications) and creates the following term.
It is an encryption of a tag InitITKReq, the public part of A's service key K [A] , and the symmetric key K a 1 by T a 1 's public key, where K a 1 is freshly generated by A. The goal of the protocol is to have the key K [A] associated with A's identity token in a way that does not reveal this link even if all but one T a i are dishonest.
Next A creates further terms from 1 .
(2) for i = 2 to n − 1 :
By the end of the sequence of encryptions (2) (n − 2 times), A will have obtained the token n−1 .
The token n−1 serves as a disguise of the service key K [A] . The symmetric keys K a i generated by A in the preceding steps are used in order to randomize the ciphertexts and to encrypt messages from token providers in later stages. Next, A signs the token n−1 and sends it to T a n , and then contacts T a n−1 , T a n−2 , . . . , T a 1 anonymously as shown in steps 3, 4, 3a, 4a. They reverse the sequence of encryptions, and at the same time build up the identity token n−1 . The notation A | −→ B means that A anonymously sends a message to B. In this case, B does not know A's identity. Similarly, A −→| B means that B receives a message anonymously, from A; A does not know B's identity.
After step 3a, before sending out a response, the token provider T a n−i checks that the session key K a n−i supplied in the request matches the one embedded in n−i (refer to previous step 2). The same rule applies to T a 1 at step 5. In addition, both token providers also check that i contained in the request was signed by a token provider.
Upon reaching step 6, A has the following identity token. The token A associates the service key K [A] with A. He presents the token to S when requesting its service.
S checks that the token is signed by some token provider, and that the value signed is a pair whose second element is the key K [A] . In case of service misuse the token may be delayered to reveal the identity of a user bound to it via the complaint resolution protocol.
Complaint Resolution.
We assume that some misuse evidence K [ A] is uniquely associated with A's service key K [A] and the service provider S. It must be verifiable by each token provider (or endorsed by a third party accepted by all token providers) and not forgeable by S.
The protocol is given as follows. As before, an illustration is given for the case n = 4 in Figure 2 . 
We assume that S has access to the chain of token providers T a 1 , . . . T a n through the application software, so S knows what signature verification keys should be used.
In message 3a, the tuple of i s serves to prevent complaint resolution messages in one session being used in another. Before sending a response each T a i checks that the sequence he receives is correct, that is, { n−i , K a i } K Ta i−1 equals to the second element in the signed tuple n−i+1 , and { n−i+1 , K a i−1 } K Ta i−2 equals to the second element in the signed tuple n−i+2 , etc. , until A is reached. This check ensures that T a i will not decrypt a token that is not related to A .
At the nth iteration S reveals the identity of the user when it receives
from T a n . Importantly, in the sequence of unfoldings of a i s, S also keeps track of a i s inside them, using the session keys K a i , in order to make sure that n−1 is formed from the session key she was given in the service request step, that is, to avoid rogue token providers disrupting or misleading the identity recovery process.
ANALYSIS OF ANONYMITY PROPERTY
We prove that the protocol satisfies anonymity: the identity token produced by the user cannot be linked to its identity, even if all but one of the token providers are dishonest. We start with defining the model of the protocol, then present some general results about the static equivalence on frames involving nonces and encryptions. We conclude the section with the proof of anonymity.
Model of the Protocol
The protocol is modeled in the applied π-calculus. We do not put restrictions on the number of sessions, or agents, and assume an active adversary (a.k.a. Dolev-Yao) that can inject as well as intercept messages from the network. Public channels represent the network and they are the means of interacting with the environment, whereas private channels are used for private communications among processes. Channels by themselves do not reveal sender or recipient of messages, and thus are anonymous. We present the model in the language of the ProVerif tool extended with a for-loop construct, which is defined as a macro expansion: for condition(j) followed by body(j) stands for body(1), body (2), ..., body(n) , where {1, . . . , n} is the set of integers that satisfy the condition(j). The scope of the loop is denoted by indetation (as in Python programming language). We also allow conditional expressions inside the for-loop, which are unpacked when the macro expansion takes place: ifex[e1=e2,e3,e4] is replaced by e3, if e1 and e2 are syntactically equal after substituting for the control variable (e.g., j) of the for-loop; otherwise it is replaced by e4.
Signature and Equations
The signature of our model includes function symbols for public key cryptographic operations and universally verifiable signing, as well as other auxiliary constants and functions used in the protocol. The purpose of the functions should be clear from the comments in brackets. The equational theory is generated by the equations shown in Figure 3 .
We sometimes write (M, N) instead of pair(M, N), and (M, N, K) instead of pair (M, pair(N, K) ). We also use some shorthands from ProVerif syntax. We write "let x = M in P" to mean P{ M / x }, and we allow pattern matching. Thus, for example, "let (
The Protocol Process
The protocol is encoded in the processes as shown in Figures 4 and 5, where processT and processU denote token provider and user, respectively (defined shortly). The fresh name skTh represents the private decryption key of the honest token provider. Signing keys are, of course, different from the private decryption keys. We allow the intruder to access honest token providers signing key; intuitively, the anonymity property relies only on the secrecy of their decryption keys. (Secrecy of the signing keys is important for other properties of the protocol, which we don't analyze.) The dishonest token providers are represented by the attacker that has an encryption key pk(skTd) and a signing key signTd. The expression of the form new n; P corresponds to the restriction νn.P of the applied-π calculus. A construct of the form (=N,y)=M pattern matches the left element of a tuple M against N, but assigns the right element of M to y.
Auxiliary Results
In this section we present several results about the static equivalence of frames. The last three lemmas of the section are particularly interesting since two of those establish criteria when a ciphertext (a public key or symmetric key encrypted message) reveals no more information to the attacker than a freshly generated value, and the last one says when a term occuring inside a ciphertext remains hidden from the attacker. We will use the lemmas to simplify analysis of the anonymity property in the next section. Assumption 1. Let E be an equational theory. We assume that the relation equality modulo E on terms is closed under substitutions of arbitrary terms for names and variables, and application of contexts. Definition 1. We write { M / N } for the substitution that replaces all occurrences of the term N by the term M.
The first simple lemma shows that exporting nonces does not affect static equivalence on frames. It is a consequence of Lemma 1 of Abadi and Fournet [2001] 
, although since that lemma is not proved there, we provide our own proof.
LEMMA 1. Let E be an equational theory, ϕ, ϕ be frames,ñ,ñ be sets of names and k a name such that k
The following lemma establishes sufficient conditions under which parts of frames can be simplified (substituted by fresh names). All further lemmas make use of this result. We say that a frame is in normal form if all the terms occurring in it are in normal form. When we write Mσ τ , it means (Mσ )τ .
LEMMA 2. Consider a convergent equational theory E, a closed term L in normal form, namesñ, s and a frame ϕ in normal form such that s ∈ f n(ϕ).
Suppose that:
All subsequent lemmas are restricted to the equational theory with standard public and session key encryption, decryption and digital signing operations (E pk ) defined in Figure 3 . We use the notation {M} k and enc(M, k) interchangeably. 
LEMMA 3. Consider the equational theory E pk , and let M, N, L and J be terms in normal form such that M, N do not contain dec(x, J) and M{
{L} J / x } = E N{ {L} J / x }. Then: (M{ {L} J / x }){ z / {L} J } = E (N{ {L} J / x }){ z / {L} J }.(1) νñ.σ k, νñ.σ {s, L} pk(k) and m ∈ f n(σ ). (2) {s, L} pk(k) does not occur in σ . (3) dec(x, k) does not occur in σ . Then νñ, s.({ {s,L} pk(k) / x }|σ ) ≈ s νñ, m.({ m / x }|σ ).
LEMMA 8. Given a closed term L in normal form, names k, s ∈ñ and a frame νñ.σ also in normal form, suppose:
(1) k occurs in σ only as an encryption key argument, that is, in the form { } k ; (2) L does not occur in σ and s ∈ f n(σ ). 
Proof of the Anonymity Property
Notation and setup: -Th is the honest token provider (meaning that it executes the protocol correctly), and Td is one of the dishonest ones (it does whatever the attacker says). In our threat model we also consider the service provider S to be dishonest. Our aim is to show the identity token produced by the user cannot be linked to its identity, even if all but one of the token providers and the service provider are dishonest and act in collusion. -We don't model dishonest token providers Td and the service provider, since they form part of the attacker (in the applied pi-calculus the attacker is represented by an active context). Their decryption and signing keys are free names. -The property is shown to hold even if Th's signing key is public. We model it as a free name that the attacker can use. Intuitively, the anonymity property hinges on the Th's private decryption key sK Th being secret. -K Th stands for the public encryption key corresponding to the decryption key sK Th , that is, pk(sK Th ) = K Th . -Honest user A is an instantiation of the process processU in Figure 4 , and correspondingly, Th is an instantiation of the process processT in Figure 5 . -ñ A is the set of names that include A's restricted values, that is, signing key, service key, and session keys generated by A during the run of the protocol. We introduce the following notion of an oracle that is used to model anonymity. . Namely, we have
, where s R is a private channel shared between the honest user A and R Th .
We now define processes A r and A l by which the Theorem 1 that follows is stated.
· 41: 13
Let A l be processU (in Figure 4) with the name restrictions of lines 13, 15, 17 removed, and with K − A in place of signU, sK [A] in place of servK, KA i in place of sesK i, and KA p A in place of sesK pU.
Let A r be processU with the same changes as in A l , and also the following changes: line 9 is replaced with new sr; let (signU,n,pU) = (signA,nA,pA) in processU | R Th), where R Th is the oracle process of Definition 2 and sr is the private channel (noted s R previously) shared only between R Th and A r . In the for-loop at line 21, line 22 is substituted by new e;let phi j = ifex[j=pU,enc((ITKReq, e,sesK j),upkT j),E] in, where E is the rhs term of the original let expression on line 22. Line 24 is replaced with new e;let commit = ifex[pU=n,sign( (InitITKSig,e,pk(signU)),signU),E] in, where E is the rhs term of the original let expression. In the for-loop at line 32, line 35 is replaced with new e;out(sr,(enc((ITKSig,e, sesK (n-j)), upkT (n-j)),phi (n-j-1)));in(sr,N); let tphi (j+1) = ifex [j=n-pU,N,E] in, where E is the original rhs expression. Line 40 is substituted by if pU=n then new e;out(sr,(enc((ITKSig,e,sesK 1),upkT 1),servK));in (sr, token);Q else let token=dec(m,sesK 1) in Q, where Q is the code on lines 41, 42, and 43.
Intuitively, the process A r represents the user A constructing an empty service token with the help of the oracle R Th . More precisely, in A r , in the message to T a 1 the user sends its signature on an empty token (ε)
, where ε is a fresh nonce generated by A. So, (ε) n A −1 does not contain A's service key K [A] , but a random value inserted at the point of encryption with Th's public key. Afterwards, A r is the same as A l up to the point where both receive a reply from Th. Then in A r the user A discards the reply from Th, creates a fresh nonce ε and with the help of the oracle R Th constructs the term (ε)
otherwise. Then A r continues the protocol as in A l . All the interaction of A with the oracle is not visible to the attacker.
The resultant service token (ε) constructed by the user in A r does not have A's identity embedded inside it, as opposed to the service token ( A) constructed in A l . So if the attacker cannot tell apart the lhs and the rhs processes depicted in the equivalence that follows then he cannot link the service token with the user's identity embedded inside it.
Comparison with Mukhamedov and Ryan [2007] . In our earlier work, we used a slightly different formulation of the anonymity property, in which two honest users swap their tokens; the anonymity property then says that this swap is indistinguishable to the attacker. In this article, we use a simpler formulation for anonymity property that we believe captures the essence of the property more faithfully, saying that the attacker cannot distinguish between a genuine and an oracle-faked token. This version is simpler because it involves one user only; and it is more faithful because the anonymity that a user obtains does not rely on the presence of another user doing something different. PROOF. We prove labeled bisimilarity between our processes, since observational equivalence ≈ coincides with labeled bisimilarity ≈ , and the latter relation is easier to reason about by hand. The definition of ≈ requires that every labeled and internal transitions of a process on one side of the equivalence are matched with those of a process on the other side. Furthermore, all the intermediate processes need to be statically equivalent.
In our case the matching of labeled transitions is straightforward, since we have essentially the same processes on both sides of the equivalence (only the data they manipulate are different): the OUT-ATOM transition only permits outputting terms by reference, so we shall have the same such labels on both sides of the equivalence; and in case of IN rule, the same term M will be input on both sides. The communication of A r with R Th over the private channel s R is not visible to the environment; there is no corresponding labeled transition. Instead, it is captured by the internal reduction COMM. Therefore, we match labeled transitions as follows: for A l 's transitions on the lhs with pick those of A r on the rhs, (and vice versa) and we match the rest with the transitions of the identical process on the other side of the equivalence. The crux of the theorem is in proving the static equivalence of the lhs and the rhs at each step.
The theorem holds if we show that the static equivalence (1) that follows holds. That is because frames of all intermediate processes resulting from ≈ transitions are subframes in the equivalence (1) and if it is true then all subframes with equal domains are also statically equivalent. We have (2), even when having access to A's and A 's signing keys, then he cannot tell part the same processes when he does not have access to those keys.
The equivalence (2) can now be simplified by omitting process νñ
, since the private names (including sK Th ) of other processes do not occur in it. In other words, if we show that (3) that follows holds, then (2) will also hold by application of the evaluation context
We now need to consider the specifics of our protocol to show (3) holds. We apply several simplifications to the preceding equivalence (steps (4) through (7) that follow) by removing parts of the frames that are already available to the environment and hence do not affect the anonymity property.
By inspection of the token provider process (Figure 5 ), we note that the frames it generates in response to ITKSig requests are of the form
. Let ψ l1 be the lefthand and ψ r1 be the righthand processes of the static equivalence (3), and suppose
, it is sufficient to show
where φ
where L is a token request message that originates from the attacker; N = N \ {p A }. To see this, note that (3) is obtained by applying the context νt (i,1) . ,1) ) / t i } to each side of (4) for each i ∈ N .
Intuitively, this step helps us to simplify the equivalence by making explicit the decryption service of the Th that is available to the attacker.
Let ψ l2 be the lefthand and ψ r2 be the righthand processes of the static equivalence (4), and for j ∈ {l, r} suppose C 2 ( j) is a context such that
j have application of sign (by some token provider T) at their outermost level. To prove (4), it is sufficient to prove
where according to our definition of the process A r if K T = K Th then y = ε else y = (ε) r n−1 . We have (5)⇒(4), because (4) is obtained by applying the context
where K − is T's signing key, to each side of (5). Intuitively, in (5) we delayered the term (i) j by breaking it up using equational rewriting and structural equivalence, and then removing a process context from each side. We recursively repeat such delayering of all nonatomic terms of the frames on both sides of the latter equivalence, except for the terms exported by the honest token provider's frames. Delayering is performed until we reach either (i) atomic terms, or (ii) nonatomic terms which are the result of applying encryption with a restricted name as the key argument (that intuitively represent a message encrypted with the honest token provider's public key, or A's session key). For example, removing one layer from ( A) Remark. In the special case when p A = n A (i.e., when Th is the last one in A's request chain) the resulting equivalence is slightly simpler and is dealt with in a similar way as what follows, omitting nonapplicable steps.
Next, by Lemma 1 we eliminate all substitutions that export session keys. So, equivalence (6) holds if:
We have unfolded ( A) Let ψ l 3 , ψ r 3 be the lhs and the rhs of the equivalence (7), respectively. We normalize those frames and consider each of the substitutions of the resulting equivalence in turn. We also note by examination of Th's protocol that it only performs decryption of messages of the form {ITKReq, Z } K Th for some term Z , which it receives as part of a larger input, and so dec(a q , sK Th ) does not occur in ψ j 3 . As a consequence, by Lemma 7 we can replace the substitution in question by a substitution of a fresh name on both sides of the equivalence. 3 , by Lemma 6 it is not derivable from those frames. The frames ψ j 3 are closed and in normal form, so dec(a p , sK Th ) does not occur in them. That in turn implies that by Lemma 7, we can replace the substitution in question by a substitution of a fresh name on both sides of the equivalence.
It is a reply from Th to A in the second stage of the protocol. As earlier, ψ j 3 KA j p A , sK Th and after the previous two transformations KA j p A does not occur in other parts of ψ j 3 . So by Lemma 8 we can replace the exported term of the substitution in question by fresh names on both sides of the equivalence.
Following the preceding transformations we note that the lhs of the equivalence is α-equivalent to the rhs. Consequently, ψ l 3 ≈ s ψ r 3 .
PROTOCOL BY MARSHALL AND MOLINA-JIMINEZ [2003]
In an earlier work Marshall and Molina-Jiminez [2003] proposed a protocol that aimed to distribute escrowed user identity among several trusted parties using standard cryptographic primitives. However, their scheme requires strong assumptions on the trusted parties and suffers weaknesses. In this section we briefly detail Marshall and Molina-Jiminez's (MJ) protocol and the problems we have identified with it.
The MJ protocol consists of two parts: sign-up protocol, where users generate anonymous service tokens, and complaint resolution protocol, which is executed to reveal the identity of the offending anonymous user. Those parts are depicted in Protocols 1 and 2, respectively.
Protocol 1 MJ sign-up protocol.
Protocol 2 MJ complaint resolution protocol.
In Protocol 1, E stands for a set of adjudicators {E 1 , . . . , E k }. The set is initially chosen by S and then H ⊆ E is chosen by A. The set of adjudicators H decide in case of a complaint from S whether it is valid and A's identity should be revealed. an id is a pseudonym that is used by A when accessing services of S; K [A] is the public part of A's anonymous service key; K A is the public part of A's temporary anonymous communication key that each T a i (i > 1) use to anonymously send messages to A.
In Protocol 2, is a complaint that S submits to adjudicators from the set H (chosen in the previous protocol), and to the set of token providers chosen by A. V = {V 1 , . . . , V n } is the set of 'yes/no' votes by E i ∈ H that decide whether is valid or not. If V is positive in the majority, S presents the tuple of signed votes V to each T a i , in order to reveal the identity of a user associated with the token of the offending user.
Analysis of MJ protocol
The protocol is subject to the following vulnerabilities.
4.1.1 Service Misuse. Any of the identity token providers can misuse services of S (or let someone else to do that) and, furthermore, it can implicate any entity of its choice in such a misuse:
Suppose T a i is a dishonest token provider. He can present any intermediate token which he receives during the sign-up protocol to S, and obtain an identifier to use the service. He can misuse the service and in doing so implicate the user who initiated the creation of the intermediate token. Moreover, since the identity token takes the form ). Clearly, the MJ protocol requires putting full trust on all token providers that are involved in generating A , since the token is not unforgeably tied to A's real identity. (1) . Suppose A has chosen a sequence of token providers T a 1 , T a 2 , . . . , T a p , and T a 1 is dishonest. Then the service provider S in a coalition with T a 1 can identify the identity token A that A has generated:
Identity Compromise
Suppose T a 1 is dishonest and reveals to S identity tickets it issues. Then it takes at most n k−1 number of operations (ITKSig requests and encryptions) for the coalition to find out A , where n is the total number of identity token providers and k is the length of A's requests chain: a straightforward bruteforce search. If we allow the coalition to eavesdrop locally on messages of other token providers T a i , then the number of operations they need to perform is polynomial in k, namely n(k − 1). (2) . Suppose S has successfully processed a complaint about a particular user. Then S can reveal the identity of any subsequent user of the service.
Once S has successfully processed a complaint, he is in possession of the information , H, V corresponding to the complaint. He can use this to make Reveal requests to any sequence of T i 's corresponding to some other protocol session, and thereby break its anonymity.
The MJ protocol has some other weaknesses too: any third party can find out who misused the services of an anonymous service provider S; a dishonest service provider S can change the set H to include more lenient adjudicators, when requesting to reveal the identity of an anonymous user in the complaint resolution protocol.
CONCLUSION
In the article, we proposed a protocol that addresses the problem of anonymity with identity escrow, which is about balancing the need for anonymity with the need for traceability and accountability on the Internet. Our protocol allows online users to access the services anonymously, while providing the possibility that the service owner can break the anonymity if its service is misused. The main feature of our scheme is it provides user anonymity even if all but one escrow holders are dishonest acting in a coalition and it achieves this property using standard cryptographic primitives. We analyzed the anonymity property of the protocol in the applied pi-calculus and in the process established compelling reduction criteria for static equivalences in a public key equational theory. Lastly, we reviewed a protocol proposed by Marshall and Molina-Jiminez [2003] that aimed to achieve goals similar to ours, and showed that their scheme suffers serious weaknesses.
APPENDICES A. APPLIED PI-CALCULUS
The applied pi-calculus [Abadi and Fournet 2001 ] is a language for describing concurrent processes and their interactions. It is based on the pi-calculus, but is intended to be less pure and therefore more convenient to use. Properties of processes described in the applied pi-calculus can be proved by employing manual techniques [Abadi and Fournet 2001] , or by automated tools such as ProVerif [Blanchet 2001] . As well as reachability properties which are typical of model checking tools, ProVerif can in some cases prove that processes are observationally equivalent [Blanchet 2004 ]. This capability is important for anonymity-type properties such as the one we study here. The applied picalculus has been used to study a variety of security protocols, such as those for private authentication [Fournet and Abadi 2003 ], for key establishment [Abadi et al. 2004] , as well as an electronic voting protocol [Kremer and Ryan 2005] .
To describe processes in the applied pi-calculus, one starts with a set of names (which are used to name communication channels or other constants), a set of variables, and a signature which consists of the function symbols which will be used to define terms. In the case of security protocols, typical function symbols will include enc for encryption, which takes plaintext and a key and returns the corresponding ciphertext, and dec for decryption, taking ciphertext and a key and returning the plaintext. Terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other terms. Terms and function symbols can be sorted, and function symbol application must then respect sorts. An equational theory E is a a signature together with a set of equations which hold on terms constructed from the signature. We denote = E the smallest equivalence relation that includes the equations in E and is closed under substitutions of arbitrary terms for names and variables, and application of contexts. A typical
example of an equational theory useful for cryptographic protocols is dec (enc(x, k) 
For example, given this theory and terms T 1 = dec(enc (enc(n, k 1 ) , k 2 ), k 2 ) and T 2 = enc(n, k 1 ), we have that T 1 = E T 2 (while obviously the syntactic equality does not hold). We write M == N if M is syntactically equivalent to N. By orienting the equations in the equational theory from left to right one can obtain a rewriting system R E . If R E is convergent, we say that E is convergent; and in that case, all terms have unique normal forms. N↓ denotes normal form of N. A frame is in normal form if all the terms occurring in it are in normal form. The standard public key encryption equational theory E pk which includes projections, pairing, digital signing, public and session key encyption, decryption functions is known to be convergent.
In the applied pi-calculus, one has (plain) processes and extended processes. Plain processes are built up in a similar way to processes in the pi-calculus, except that messages can contain terms (rather than just names). In the grammar described next, M and N are terms, n is a name, x a variable and u is a metavariable, that is, a name or a variable. P, Q, R := plain processes 0 null process
Extended processes add active substitutions and restriction on variables.
A , B, C := extended processes P plain process
} is the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term M. Active substitutions generalize "let". The process νx.({ M / x } | P) corresponds exactly to "let x = M in P". As usual, names and variables have scopes which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We write fv(A), bv(A), fn(A), and bn(A) for the sets of free and bound variables and free and bound names of A, respectively. We say that an extended process is closed if all its variables are either bound or defined by an active substitution.
Active substitutions are useful because they allow us to map an extended process A to its frame φ( A) by replacing every plain process in A with 0. A frame is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel composition and restriction. The frame φ( A) can be viewed as an approximation of A that accounts for the static knowledge A exposes to its environment, but not A's dynamic behavior. Every frame can be written in the form ϕ = νñ. {T 1 /x 1 , . . . , T n /x n }. The domain of ϕ is dom(ϕ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. We say that ϕ is closed if all the terms T i are closed, that is, contain no variables. Definition 3. We say two terms M, N are equal in the frame ϕ, and write
is a process with a hole; an evaluation context is a context whose hole is not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output. Structural equivalence, noted ≡, is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed under α-conversion on names and variables, by application of evaluation contexts, and satisfying some further basic structural rules, namely, for all names n, extended processes A , B, plain processes P, and variables or names u, v:
A | 0 ≡ A; -associativity and commutativity of |;
We can now define what it means for two frames to be statically equivalent.
Definition 4 (Static Equivalence). Two closed frames ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are statically equivalent, written ϕ 1 ≈ s ϕ 2 , iff for some namesñ, and substitutions σ 1 , σ 2 , such that ϕ 1 ≡ νñ.σ 1 and ϕ 2 ≡ νñ.σ 2 , we have that:
(i) dom(ϕ 1 ) = dom(ϕ 2 ), (ii) for all terms M, N with variables included in dom(ϕ i ) and using no names occurring inñ, Mσ 1 = E Nσ 1 is equivalent to Mσ 2 = E Nσ 2 .
We also say that two extended processes A and B are statically equivalent if and only if φ( A) ≈ s φ(B).
where s 1 , s 2 and k are names. Let E be the theory defined by the axiom dec (enc(x, k) 
The operational semantics of processes in the applied pi-calculus is defined by structural rules defining two relations: structural equivalence (described earlier) and internal reduction, noted →. Internal reduction → is the smallest relation on extended processes closed under structural equivalence and application of evaluation contexts such thatā x .P | a(x).Q → P | Q and for all Definition 5 (Deducibility). Given a frame ϕ that represents a history of messages output during the execution of the processes, we define the deduction relation, denoted by ϕ M. Deducible messages are those that can be derived from ϕ by application of function symbols and the equational theory E. We further extend the operational semantics by a labeled operational semantics enabling us to reason about processes that interact with their environment. Labeled operational semantics defines the relation α → where α is either an input or the output of a channel name or a variable of base type. More details can be found in Abadi and Fournet [2001] . We have The term Nσ ↓ is distinct from k, since νñ.σ k, which easily follows from our assumption that k occurs in σ only as an encryption key argument. So, again by the IH dec(x, k) does not occur in M σ ↓. PROOF. Let L = {s, L} pk(k) . It is known that νñ.σ L if for any M, such that f n(M) ∩ñ = ∅, Mσ = E L . The latter inequality will hold if we show that Mσ ↓ = E L . We proceed by induction on M.
Base case. M == u. If u ∈ dom(σ ) then there is nothing to do, else uσ == N, where { N / u } is a substitution in σ . As σ is in normal form, all subterms of N are also in normal form. We note that L is in normal form too because L is in normal form by assumption. Furthermore, every subterm K of N is distinct from L , as L does not occur in σ . As a result, for all such K, K = E L by the fact that normal forms are unique.
Induction step. Take some M, N such thatñ ∩ f n(M, N) = ∅. By the facts that s ∈ñ and s ∈ f n(σ ), we see that for all subterms K of Mσ ↓ and Nσ ↓, we have K = E L . Then we need to consider the following cases: 
